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SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 

RELOCATION CENTERS 


fiK LIBRA* 
CONGRESS 
SERIAL RECORD 


MESSAGE 

FROM 


SEP2 3 j 443 

•m .» 

yp SOUS'" 


THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING 


REPORT ON SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 166 RELATING TO SEGRE¬ 
GATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE IN RELOCATION 
CENTERS AND PLANS FOR FUTURE OPERATION OF SUCH 
CENTERS 


September 14, 1943.—Read; referred to the Committee on Military Affairs and 

ordered to be printed 


The White House, 
Washington, September 14, 1943. 

The President of the Senate. 

Subject: Senate Resolution 166 adopted by the Senate on July 6, 1943. 

Sir: On July 6, 1943, the Senate considered and agreed to Senate 
Resolution 166. 

The resolution relates to the program for relocating persons of 
Japanese ancestry evacuated from west coast military areas and asks 
that the President issue an Executive order to accomplish two things— 
(1) to direct the War Relocation Authority to segregate the disloyal 
persons, and the persons whose loyalty is questionable, from those 
whose loyalty to the United States has been established; and (2) to 
direct the appropriate agency of the Government to issue a full and 
complete authoritative statement on conditions in relocation centers 
and plans for future operations. 

I imd that the War Relocation Authority has already undertaken a 
program of segregation. That program is now under way. The 
first train movements began in early September. 

In response to the resolution I asked the Director of the Office of 
War Mobilization to issue a full and complete authoritative public 




S. Doc. 96, 78-1-1 


f 


3 



Mo&o-raxm 












2 SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AN)I> DISLOYAL JAPANESE 

statement on conditions in relocation centers and plans for future 
operations. A short preliminary statement on this subject was issued 
on July 17, 1943. A full and complete statement is being made public 
today. Copies of these statements are transmitted with this message. 

Thus, both of the steps called for in Senate Resolution 166 have 
already been taken, and it appears that issuance of a further Executive 
order is not necessary for accomplishment of these purposes. 

The segregation program of the War Relocation Authority pro¬ 
vides for transferring to a single center, the Tule Lake Center in 
northeastern California, those persons of Japanese ancestry residing 
in relocation centers who have indicated that their loyalties lie with 
Japan. All persons among the evacuees who have expressed a wish 
to return to Japan for permanent residence have been included among 
the segregants, along with those among the citizen evacuees who 
have answered in the negative, or have refused to answer, a direct 
question as to their willingness to declare their loyalty to the United 
States and to renounce any allegiance to any foreign government. 
In addition, those evacuees who are found, after investigation and 
hearing, to be ineligible to secure indefinite leave from a relocation 
center, under the leave regulations of the War Relocation Authority, 
are to be included among the segregants. 

While the precise number of segregants is not established at this 
time because a number of leave clearance investigations have not yet 
been completed, it is established that the disloyal persons among the 
evacuees constitute but a small minority, and that the great majority 
of evacuees are loyal to the democratic institutions of the United 
States. 

Arrangements are being completed for the adequate guarding and 
supervision of the segregated evacuees. They will be adequately fed 
and housed and their treatment will in all respects be fair and humane; 
they will not, however, be eligible to leave the Tide Lake Center while 
the war with Japan continues or so long as the military situation 
requires their residence there. An appeals procedure to allow for the 
correction of mistakes made in determining who shall be segregated 
has been established so that the entire procedure may be fair and 
equitable. 

With the segregation of the disloyal evacuees in a separate center, 
the War Relocation Authority proposes now to redouble its efforts to 
accomplish the relocation into normal homes and jobs in communities 
throughout the United States, but outside the evacuated areas, of 
those Americans of Japanese ancestry whose loyalty to this country 
has remained unshaken through the hardships of the evacuation which 
military necessity made unavoidable. We shall restore to the loyal 
evacuees the right to return to the evacuated areas as soon as the 
military situation will make such restoration feasible. Americans of 
Japanese ancestry, like those of many other ancestries, have shown 
that they can, and want to, accept our institutions and work loyally 
with the rest of us, making their own valuable contribution to the 
national wealth and well-being. In vindication of the very ideals for 
which we are fighting this war it is important to us to maintain a high 
standard of fair, considerate, and equal treatment for the people of 
this minority as of all other minorities. 

Respectfully, 


Franklin D. Roosevelt. 


. Pi u Piss' 

l 



i 2 

STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR OF WAR MOBILIZATION 



On July 17, James F. Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization, issued 
a preliminary statement which was prepared at the President’s request 
by the War Department and the W ar Relocation Authority in response 
to Senate Resolution 166 relative to the treatment of persons of Japan¬ 
ese ancestry in relocation centers. Justice Byrnes today issued a more 
comprehensive statement which was prepared at the President’s re¬ 
quest by the War Relocation Authority in response to Senate Resolu¬ 
tion 166. The statement in full follows: 

A Comprehensive Statement in Response to Senate Resolution 

No. 166 

On July 6, 1943, the United States Senate adopted Senate Resolu¬ 
tion No. 166 introduced by Senator Sheridan Downey of California. 
The resolution called upon the President (1) to order the immediate 
segregation of disloyal persons of Japanese ancestry in relocation cen¬ 
ters ancl (2) to have issued by the appropriate agency of Government a 
comprehensive authoritative statement on relocation centers and fu¬ 
ture relocation plans. Since the War Relocation Authority had ini- 
ated plans for a segregation program prior to adoption of the resolu¬ 
tion, no Presidential action on the first part of the resolution has been 
necessary. The following statement is issued in response to the second 
part of the resolution. 


THE PACIFIC COAST EVACUATION 


On February 19, 1942, the President signed Executive Order No. 
9066 empowering the Secretary of War or any military commander 
the Secretary might designate to prescribe military areas and to 
provide for the exclusion from such areas of any persons whose presence 
was deemed prejudicial to the national defense. Eleven days later, 
on March 2, the commanding general of the Western Defense Com¬ 
mand issued a proclamation prescribing the western portion of the 
three west coast States 1 and the southern part of Arizona, as a military 
area and announced that all persons of Japanese ancestry—both 
alien and citizen—would be excluded from this area. On March 18 
the President signed Executive Order No. 9102 establishing the 
War Relocation Authority within the Office for Emergency Manage¬ 
ment and directing the Authority to provide for tne relocation of 
persons evacuated from military areas under the provisions of Execu¬ 
tive Order No. 9066. The principal aim behind the creation of the 
new agency was to relieve the military of the complicated and burden¬ 
some fob of maintaining and reestablishing a dislocated people. 

Throughout most of March in 1942 the people of Japanese ancestry 
residing within the prescribed west coast area were freely permitted 
and even encouraged to move out voluntarily and resettle inland on 

* Later, in June, the evacuation area was enlarged to take in the entire State of California. 


* * V 


3 



4 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AN© DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


their own initiative. The original hope was that a considerable 
portion of these people would be able to establish themselves outside 
the prescribed area with a minimum of Government assistance. 
Before the War Relocation Authority was more than a week old, 
however, it became apparent that such a large-scale migration could 
be handled effectively only on a controlled and orderly basis. In 
many communities of the intermountain region, there were strong 
protests against the arrival of evacuees from the coastal zone; and in 
some areas, violence appeared imminent. Consequently, on March 
27 the commanding general of the Western Defense Command issued 
an order (to become effective on March 29) prohibiting further volun¬ 
tary migration and “freezing” the people of Japanese ancestry in 
their homes until they could be moved by the Army. 

Nine days after this order became effective—on April 7—the 
Director of the War Relocation Authority and Col. Karl R. Bendetsen, 
representing the Western Defense Command, met with a group of 
Governors and other State officials of the Western States in Salt 
Lake City to discuss plans for relocating the evacuated people. At 
that meeting the War Relocation Authority presented for considera¬ 
tion a relocation plan composed of three basic points: 

(1) Establishment of Government-operated centers where some 

of the evacuees could be quartered and could contribute 
through work on Government projects, to their own 
support; 

(2) Reemployment of evacuees in private industry or in agri¬ 

culture outside the evacuated areas; 

(3) Governmental assistance for small groups of evacuees desir¬ 

ing to establish self-supporting colonies of an agricultural 
character. 

The reaction of the assembled Governors and other State officials to 
this program was unmistakable. Strong opposition was expressed to 
any type of unsupervised relocation and some of the Governors 
refused to be responsible for maintenance of law and order unless 
evacuees brought into their States were kept under constant military 
surveillance. Following the meeting, the War Relocation Authority 
abandoned plans for assisting groups of evacuees in private coloniza¬ 
tion, temporarily laid aside plans for private employment, and con¬ 
centrated on establishment of Government-operated centers with 
sufficient capacity and facilities to accommodate the entire evacuee 
population. 

FUNCTIONS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND OF THE WAR RELOCATION 

AUTHORITY 

Almost immediately after the creation of the War Relocation 
Authority, a tentative agreement was reached between the Director 
of the Authority and the ‘Western Defense Command covering the 
responsibilities of the two agencies in the evacuation and relocation 
process. Later, on March 17, this agreement was expanded and 
formalized in a memorandum of understanding signed by the Director 
of the Authority and the Assistant Secretary of War. Briefly, the 
memorandum provided that the War Department would be respon¬ 
sible for (1) evacuating the people of Japanese ancestry from their 
homes, (2) establishing and administering temporary assembly 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AN'D DISLOYAL JAPANESE 



centers where the evacuees could be quartered while relocation centers 
were being constructed, (3) construction of basic housing and facilities 
at relocation center sites, (4) transporting the evacuees from assembly 
to relocation centers, and (5) provision of a military guard around 
the exterior boundaries of relocation centers. The "YV ar Relocation 
Authority assumed full responsibility for management of the reloca¬ 
tion centers and for maintenance of the evacuees once they were 
delivered by the Army at the relocation center gates. The full text 
of the agreement follows: 


April 17, 1942. 

M EMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND 'WAR 

Relocation Authority 

Preamble: The War Relocation Authority is an independent establishment 
created by Executive Order of the President No. 9102, dated March 18, 1942, with 
a primary objective of relieving the Military Establishment of the burden of 
providing for the relocation of persons excluded from military areas by order 
of the Secretary of War or any designated military commander acting pursuant 
to Executive Order of the President No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942. The 
emphasis in all War Relocation Authority activities will be increasingly to 
alleviate the drain on military resources with regard to all phases of evacuation 
and relocation. The War Relocation Authority has agreed to prepare itself ns 
rapidly as practicable to assume those burdens now imposed on the War Depart¬ 
ment respecting such activities and particularly in connection with Pacific coast 
evacuation now in progress. Accordingly the following understanding is executed 
between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority "to meet the 
present situation. 

1. The evacuation of combat zones is a military necessity and when determined 
upon must not be retarded by resettlement and relocation. In other words, the 
timing of evacuation is a military function which War Relocation Authority will 
do all in its power to accommodate. 

2. Assembly centers are staging areas and necessary because of the time re¬ 
quired to select relocation sites and to construct relocation centers (reception 
centers). Assembly centers are constructed and will be supplied and operated 
by the War Department. 

3. Relocation sites, upon which relocation centers (reception centers) are built, 
are to be selected by the War Relocation Authority, subject to War Department 
approval. 

4. The acquisition, as distinguished from selection, of sites for relocation centers 
(reception centers) is a War Department function. Such acquisition will be made 
by the War Department upon the request of the War Relocation Authority. 
The War Relocation Authority will reimburse the War Department for the 
acquisition cost of relocation sites or pay the cost in the first instance. 

(а) As a part of the acquisition procedure, respecting both private and public 
lands, the War Department, through an appropriate military commander, will 
advise the chief executive of the State concerned of the military necessity for the 
location of a relocation project within that State. 

(б) The War Relocation Authority has full responsibility for compilation of 
the necessary data and descriptions in connection with 3 and 4 above. 

5. Construction of initial facilities at relocation centers (reception centers) 
will be accomplished by the War Department. This initial construction will 
include all facilities necessary to provide the minimum essentials of living, viz, 
shelter, hospital, mess, sanitary facilities, administration building, housing for 
relocation staff, post office, storehouses, essential refrigeration equipment, and 
military police housing. (War Department construction will not include refine¬ 
ments such as schools, churches, and other community planning adjuncts.) The 
placement and construction uf military police housing will be subject to the 
approval of the appropriate military commander. 

6. The War Department will procure and supply the initial equipment for 
relocation centers (reception centers), viz, kitchen equipment, minimum mess 
and barrack equipment, hospital equipment, and 10 days’ supply of nonperishable 
subsistence based on the relocation center (reception center) evacuee capacity. 
From the date of opening, or the date on which the War Relocation Authority 
initiates the operation of any relocation center (reception center), as the case 


6 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AN© DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


may be, the War Department will transfer accountability for all such equipment 
and property to the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority 
agrees to assume such accountability. Thereafter, the War Relocation Authority 
will maintain and replace all such equipment and property, including subsistence, 
and will procure whatever additional supplies, subsistence, and equipment it 
may require. The War Department agrees that the War Relocation Authority 
may effect its procurement through War Department agencies. 

(a) As to all routine procurement effected by the War Relocation Authority 
through War Department agencies, said Authority agrees that it will transmit to 
the War Department a forecast of its requirements semiannually in advance, and 
that it ‘will confirm in writing to the appropriate War Department agency its 
actual requirements from time to time as the need for such procurement develops. 
The War Relocation Authority will take all possible and practicable steps to 
inform the War Department well in advance of its requirements. 

7. After pending arrangements for existing reception centers are completed 
the War Relocation Authority will operate relocation centers (reception centers) 
from the date of opening. This will include staffing, administration, project 
planning, and complete operation and maintenance. In undertaking such opera¬ 
tions the War Relocation Authority will not retard completion of the evacuation 
process but will accommodate military requirements. It will be prepared to 
accept successive increments of evacuees as construction is completed and sup¬ 
plies and equipment are delivered. In each case the War Relocation Authority 
will provide a project manager who will be available to the War Department 
local construction representative for consultation as soon as a given project is 
approved for construction. 

8. The War Department will provide for the transportation of evacuees to 
assembly centers and from assembly centers to relocation centers (reception 
centers) under appropriate military escort. The War Department, through the 
Western Defense Command, has arranged for the storage of household effects of 
evacuees through the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. At War Depart¬ 
ment expense, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has acquired warehouse 
space, provided civilian guards, and has arranged for inventories of goods stored 
by each evacuee. When evacuee goods are stored and the Federal Reserve 
Bank delivers inventory receipts to the War Relocation Authority, said Authority 
will accept such receipts from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and, 
upon such acceptance, said Authority assumes the responsibility now borne by 
the War Department for the warehousing program, including the assumption 
from the date of delivery of receipts, of payment of all costs. Thereafter, the 
disposition of such household effects and the transportation thereof to relocation 
centers, or elsewhere, will be the sole responsibility of the War Relocation 
Authority. 

9. In the interest of the security of the evacuees relocation sites will be desig¬ 
nated by the appropriate military commander or by the Secretary of War, as the 
case may be, as prohibited zones and military areas, and appropriate restrictions 
with respect to the rights of evacuees and others to enter, remain in, or leave 
such areas will be promulgated so that ingress and egress of all persons, including 
evacuees, will be subject to the control of the responsible military commander. 
Each relocation site will be under military-police patrol and protection as deter¬ 
mined by the War Department. Relocation centers (reception centers) will have 
a, minimum capacity of 5,000 evacuees (until otherwise agreed to) in order that 
the number of military police required for patrol and protection will be kept at 
a minimum. 


10. It is understood that all commitments herein as relate to the use of War 
Department and/or war relocation funds are subject to the approval of the Bureau 
of the Budget. 

War Relocation Authority, 

By M. S. Eisenhower, 

Director. 

War Department, 

By J. J. McCloy, 

Assistant Secretary of War. 


SELECTION OF SITES FOR RELOCATION CENTERS 

While the evacuation was.moving forward under supervision of the 
Western Defense Command, the War Relocation Authority and the 
Army began an extensive search for areas where the evacuees might 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL ANID- DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


7 


settle down to a more stable kind of life until plans could be developed 
for their permanent relocation in communities outside of the evacuated 
areas. Because of the nature of the relocation program, the possi¬ 
bilities were sharply limited. Requirements for sites were announced 
by the Authority on April 13 as follows: 

1. All centers must be located on public land so that improvements at public 
expense become public, not private, assets. Any land acquired for this purpose 
will remain in public ownership. 

2. Because of manpower needs in the armed services and because the minimum 
guard unit can guard 5,000 persons as easily as smaller groups, first attention 
will be given to sites adequate for large projects. 

3. Each center must provide work opportunities throughout the year for the 
available workers to be located there. 

4. All centers must be located at a safe distance from strategic works. 

To aid in the job of site selection, the Authority enlisted the coop¬ 
eration of technicians from a number of Federal and State agencies. 
More than 300 proposals were considered on paper and nearly 100 
possible sites were actually examined by field inspection crews. Some 
were rejected because they were too small; others were turned down 
by the Army for military reasons; and still others were found un¬ 
suitable for a wide variety of causes. 

By June 5 sites for 10 relocation centers had been selected and con¬ 
struction work at four of the sites was well under way. By the first 
week in November the entire evacuee population had been transferred 
either from assembly centers or—-in some cases—direct from their 
homes into relocation centers. A total of 110,000 persons, according 
to records of the Western Defense Command, were evacuated from 
their homes. The location of the 10 centers and their population as 
of July 10, 1943, are shown in the following table: 


Relocation center 

Location 

Population 
as of July 

10, 1943 

Central Utah... ... _ _ 

Topaz, Utah.. _ _ 

7, 237 

15, 530 

12, 355 
6,170 
9, 292 
7, 767 
8,716 
7, 548 
7,616 

13, 422 

Colorado River_ ___ ____ . ... 

Poston, Ariz_ - __ 

Gila River_ .. ____ _ 

Rivers, Ariz____ 

Granada _ _ _ _*_ 

Amache, Colo __ . 

Heart Mountain .. . . _ . __ 

Heart Mountain, Wyo _ -__ 

Jerome _ _ . .. _ _ 

Denton, Ark _ _ . 

Manzanar __ . .. _ .. . . _ 

Manzanar, Calif . 

Minidoka - -----__ _ 

Hunt, Idaho.. . ___ __ 

Rohwer _ - . __ 

Relocation, Ark.. __ _ __ 

Tule Lake _ .. -- _ - 

Newell, Calif_ __ 

Total - - - . -- - _ _ 


95, 703 




(The War Relocation Authority is also operating a small isolation center at Leupp, Ariz.) 


GENERAL PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE EVACUATION 

Evacuation of the Japanese American population from their homes 
and occupations on the west coast, and their relocation in 10 newly 
established wartime communities is a movement without precedent 
in the United States. Inevitably such an undertaking has created 
problems, not all of which could be foreseen. The size of the task, 
involving more than 100,000 men, women, and children, as well as its 
unprecedented character, has contributed to the complexity of the 
undertaking. 

At the present time the responsibilities of the War Relocation 
Authority, in dealing with these problems, fall into three main cate¬ 
gories. First are those problems arising in the administration of 































8 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AN)D CIS LOYAL JAPANESE 


relocation centers. While the Authority docs not consider the centers 
as permanent places of residence and does not feel that the mainte¬ 
nance of evacuees in relocation centers represents the most construc¬ 
tive solution to the over-all problem, the fact remains that the great 
majority of evacuees are now in the centers, and that their proper 
maintenance there is a clear responsibility of the Government. 

Second are the problems arising from the release of evacuees for 
work outside the centers and for other purposes. Even before the 
evacuation from certain of the restricted areas had been initiated,the 
Army and the War Relocation Authority were forced by the demands 
in many of the Western States for agricultural labor to develop a 
program for releasing large numbers of evacuees for outside employ¬ 
ment. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1942, the number of 
evacuees released on temporary work leave reached nearly 10,000. 

Problems arising in the management of property owned by evacuees 
in the evacuated areas constitute the third major category of prob¬ 
lems with which the War Relocation Authority is concerned. Under 
plans developed by the Army as a part of the evacuation program, 
evacuees were offered assistance through the medium of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Farm Security Administration 
in the leasing, sale, or management of their property. In August 1942 
responsibilities in this field were transferred, at the request of the 
cooperating agencies, to the War Relocation Authority. 


THE NATURE OF THE EVACUATED POPULATION 

The present population of the 10 relocation centers is approximately 
95,000. Roughly two-thirds of these people are American citizens by 
virtue of birth in this country. The remaining one-third are aliens, 
whose naturalization is not permitted under the laws of the United 
States. The distribution of this population by age and sex is sug¬ 
gested by the following table, based upon the United States Census 
of 1940: 


Distribution of Japanese population by age, sez, and nativity compared to “average” 1 
groupings of non-Japanese population—States of Arizona, California, Oregon, and 
Washington, 1940 


Age groups 

Male 

Female. 

Total 

Japanese population 

“Aver¬ 
age” 1 
popu¬ 
lation 

Japanese population 

“Aver¬ 
age” 1 
popu¬ 
lation 

Japan¬ 

ese 

popu¬ 

lation 

“Aver¬ 
age” 1 
popu¬ 
lation 

N ative- 
born 

Foreign- 

born 

Total 

Native- 

born 

Foreign- 

born 

Total 

0 to 4 years_ 

3, 728 

30 

3, 758 

4,330 

3, 407 

25 

3, 432 

3,447 

7,190 

7, 777 

5 to 9 years__ 

4,148 

37 

4,185 

4,135 

4,131 

39 

4,170 

3,322 

8,355 

7. 457 

10 to 14 years.. . .. 

6, 476 

63 

6, 539 

4,519 

6, 271 

54 

6, 325 

3, 627 

12, 864 

8,146 

15 to 19 years_ 

9,291 

141 

9, 432 

5, 074 

8, 596 

105 

8, 701 

4,099 

18,133 

9, 173 

20 to 24 years_ 

7, 654 

227 

7,881 

5, 248 

6, 540 

215 

6, 755 

4, 221 

14, 636 

9, 469 

25 to 29 years, . 

3, 964 

341 

4,305 

5, 505 

3,113 

252 

3, 365 

4,357 

7, 670 

9, 862 

30 to 34 years_ 

1, 561 

959 

2, 520 

5, 211 

1,138 

812 

1,950 

4,047 

4, 470 

9, 258 

35 to 39 years_ 

749 

2, 588 

3,337 

4,975 

371 

2, 673 

3,044 

3, 816 

6, 381 

8, 791 

40 to 44 years_ 

262 

2, 892 

3,154 

4, 634 

132 

3, 782 

3,914 

3, 588 

7, 068 

8, 222 

45 to 49 years,_ 

132 

2,169 

2, 301 

4,414 

63 

3, 490 

3, 553 

3, 385 

5, 854 

7, 799 

50 to 54 years_ 

58 

5,157 

5,215 

4,143 

25 

2,172 

2, 197 

3.055 

7,412 

7, 198 

55 to 59 years_ 

32 

4, 720 

4, 752 

3,454 

5 

1,160 

1,165 

2, 545 

5.917 

5, 999 

60 to 64 years_ 

15 

3, 662 

3, 677 

2.729 

3 

770 

773 

2, 128 

4.450 

4, 857 

65 to 69 years_ 

6 

1, 500 

1,506 

2,019 

1 

292 

293 

1,689 

1,799 

3. 708 

70 to 74 years_ 

9 

476 

485 

1,402 

1 

80 

81 

1, 175 

566 

2, 577 

75 years and over,., 

9 

152 

161 

1,416 

5 

54 

59 

1, 276 

220 

2,692 

Total _ 

38, 094 

25,114 

63, 208 

63, 208 

33, 802 

15,975 

49, 777 

49, 777 

112. 985 

112. 985 


1 The “average” population indicates what the distribution, by age and sex, of the Japanese-American 
population in the Pacific Coast States in 1949 would .have been had it conformed to the distribution by age 
and sex of the non-Japanese population in these 4 States. 


Source: Bureau of Census 






























































SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND ELS LOYAL JAPANESE 9 

As of 1942, the median age of the alien male population was approxi¬ 
mately 56 years; of the alien female population approximately 47 
years; and ol the citizen population about 18 years. The “average” 
column in the previous tabulation is introduced to indicate what the 
distribution, by age and sex, of the Japanese-American population in 
the Pacific coast in 1940 would have been had it conformed to the 
distribution by age and sex of the non-Japanese population in the 
four States in 1940. 

In addition to the wide and distinct difference in age between the 
citizen and alien groups in this population, probably its most important 
characteristics from the point of view of relocation center adminis¬ 
tration are (1) the relative lack of persons in the age group of 30 to 50, 
which generally constitutes the most productive part of the working 
populations; (2) the relatively high proportion of school students 
(5 to 19) in the total population and the relatively high population 
of high-school students in the school population (nearly double that 
found in a normal community); and (3) the relatively low proportion 
of persons 65 years of age and older. These abnormal age character¬ 
istics of the evacuee population have occasioned problems differing 
both in kind and size from those found in the normal American 
community. 

EVACUATION FROM HAWAII 

Although no mass evacuation of persons of Japanese descent, 
similar to that on the west coast, was deemed necessary or advisable 
in the Hawaiian Islands, the Army has carried out a small-scale 
evacuation of people of Japanese ancestry from the Territory to the 
mainland. 

The first evacuees from Hawaii were received in relocation centers 
on November 23, 1942. Since that time, 1,037 Hawaiian evacuees 
have been received at centers. Of this group, approximately 60 per¬ 
cent are males, approximately 40 percent are under 17 years of age, 
and 13 percent over 37 years of age. 

BASIC POLICIES OF CENTER ADMINISTRATION 

The War Relocation Authority has undertaken to provide all 
evacuees residing in centers the following essentials: Housing, food, 
medical care, and education through the high-scliool level. In each 
of these categories the facilities provided are the minimum necessary 
to meet reasonable American standards. 

HOUSING 

All evacuees in centers are housed in barracks, which are divided 
into four or more one-room apartments. The barracks are grouped in 
blocks, each of which is made up of 14 barracks, a central toilet and 
bathhouse, a laundry room, mess hall, and a recreation hall. 

This housing for evacuees is part of the basic center construction, 
which was designed and built by the United States Army Engineers. 
The Army’s original plan, which was agreed to by the War Relocation 
Authority, contemplated that a minimum of one room would be made 
available to each family, and that no family would be required to 
share its one-room apartment with anyone else. At the present 
time, in order to make barracks space available for schools, church 


10 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND* DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


services, and other community purposes, the War Relocation Authority 
is unable to meet this standard. Many families are, at the present 
time, required to share barracks space with outsiders. Similarly, 
few recreation halls are available for the block uses for which they were 
constructed. The War Relocation Authority’s program for the con¬ 
struction of schools and other facilities and the gradual relocation 
outside the centers of eligible families are both steps aimed to remedy 
this situation. 

All center construction is of a temporary character, similar to the 
Army’s theater of operations type of construction. While the centers 
differ from each other in minor details, the most common type of 
building is a frame structure covered with plain sheathing lumber and 
tar poper. Because of the heat, the Arizona centers have double 
roofs; because of the cold, some of the more northern centers have 
finished interior walls. None of the barracks lias running water; 
all have electric lights and some sort of heating stove for each apart¬ 
ment. 


Food mid mess operations . 

All evacuees eat in mess halls operated by the Authority. In each 
center, mess operations are directed by a chief steward, who is a 
member of the administrative staff. He has one or two appointed 
assistants. Under the direction of the chief steward and his immedi¬ 
ate assistants, all work connected with requisitioning, receipt, ware¬ 
housing, issue, preparation and serving of food, and the maintenance 
and operation of subsistence warehouses and mess halls is performed 
by evacuee personnel. Recognizing the importance of mess operations 
to the morale of the centers, the stewards undertake to provide good, 
wholesome food, selected and prepared to the taste of the evacuees. 
Because of the varied nature of the population, which includes some 
peoples whose tastes are very largely Japanese, along with others 
whose tastes are almost wholly American, it is not easy to prepare 
menus which will satisfy the entire population. Experience seems to 
indicate that the best way to deal with this situation is to alternate 
Oriental and American types of foods. 

It is the policy of the Authority to provide simple, substantial foods. 
All rationing regulations and recommendations applicable to the 
civilian population of this country are observed in the administration 
of center mess operations. In addition, 2 meatless days are observed 
each week and no fancy meats of any kind are served. In areas 
where local milk supplies are short, milk is provided only to small 
children, nursing or expectant mothers, and special dietary cases. 

With the exception of some food which is produced by the evacuees 
themselves at the centers and some perishable commodities which 
are bought locally, practically all food served at the centers is pur¬ 
chased through the Quartermaster Corps of the United States Army. 
Arrangements were made to buy food through the Army both to 
give the War Relocation Authority the advantage of Army experi¬ 
ence and facilities, and to give the Army an opportunity to prevent 
competition by the War Relocation Authority in certain markets for 
food needed for the armed forces. 

War relocation centers are operating under a cash ration allowance 
of 45 cents per person per day. This cost includes the cost of feeding 
special diet cases, infants, and pregnant women. Over the past few 
months the actual daily cost of feeding has ranged from 34 to 42 
cents per person. 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAlL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


11 


EDUCATION 

One-fourth of the evacuee population in the centers is of school age 
and is hi school. This is substantially larger than the proportion of 
school children in the normal population. Moreover, as has been 
suggested above, a disproportionately large part of the school popula¬ 
tion is of high-school age. Virtually all of the school children in the 
population were born in this country and are citizens. Virtually all 
were being educated prior to evacuation in American public schools. 

It is the policy of the War Relocation Authority to provide ele¬ 
mentary and high-school facilities, meeting the minimum standards 
of the States in which the centers are located and providing education 
which will permit the students to return to public school outside the 
centers after the war without loss of credit for the time spent in the 
centers. Educational programs have been developed and curricula 
planned in cooperation with the State school authorities of the States 
in which centers are located. All teaching is in English. No Japanese 
language schools of the type common on the Pacific coast before evacu¬ 
ation are permitted in the centers. Refresher courses in the Japanese 
language, however, are being given at some of the centers for instruc¬ 
tors and interpreters intending to go out in intelligence work. 

The entire evacuee population has expressed a keen interest in 
the educational program. When basic educational plans were being 
made, the Authority was asked expressly by leaders of the evacuee 
population to provide as large a proportion as possible of non-Japanese 
teachers. They felt that prior to evacuation schools had been the 
biggest single force for Americanization and expressed the hope that 
their children would continue to have contact with qualified non- 
Japanese teachers. Because of this fact, and because there are rela¬ 
tively few qualified teachers among the evacuees, original plans called 
for employment of at least three-fourths of the teaching staff from 
outside the centers. At the present time, nearly 90 percent of the 
certified teaching staff is composed of persons who are not of Japanese 
descent. Evacuees are used extensively as assistant teachers and 
teacher aides. 

Appointed teachers are employed under Civil Service regulations 
and are paid salaries established under the Classification Act. Because 
of the administrative necessity of keeping children occupied in the 
relatively crowded confines of the relocation centers, schools are 
operated 11 months out of the year. Even on such a basis it will 
be more than a year before the school time lost during evacuation 
and relocation is made up. 

Schools are now operating in space originally constructed for bar¬ 
racks. Facilities for scientific and vocational work at the high-school 
level are inadequate. In most centers, living quarters have been 
crowded to make barrack space available for schools. To relieve this 
situation, the War Relocation Authority has undertaken to build 
school buildings of a temporary character similar in construction to 
the other buildings of the centers. Plans have been completed and 
priorities secured for the construction of high schools at most centers. 
Elementary classes, however, will continue to be held in the barracks. 


12 


SElGiRIEiGlAT'ION OF LOYAL AN© DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


MEDICAL CARE AND HOSPITALIZATION 

Recognizing the possibility that the process of evacuation and reloca¬ 
tion might increase the susceptibility of the evacuee population to 
disease and that the likelihood of serious epidemics is greater in camp 
communities than in normal communities, the Army made provision 
in the basic construction program of the centers for a fully equipped 
hospital on each center. Because the barracks-type housing is un¬ 
suited to home care of the sick, even minor illnesses are considered 
hospital cases in the relocation centers. This consideration caused the 
Army to provide a higher ratio of hospital beds to the population 
(about IS to 1,000) than is customary in most normal communities. 

The War Relocation Authority provides an appointed medical 
director in each center, appointed under civil service and paid ac¬ 
cording to the Classification Act. All other medical positions, all 
dental positions, and such technical positions as X-ray technologist, 
pharmacist, and laboratory technician are filled to the fullest extent 
possible with evacuee personnel. From the beginning there has been 
a serious shortage of qualified evacuee nurses at the centers; and within 
the past few months the number of evacuee doctors has been dras¬ 
tically reduced b}^ outside relocation. In fact, the most serious 
problem of health administration on the centers is the very small 
number of qualified doctors and nurses available. At present, the 
Authority is using a much larger proportion of nurses aides from the 
evacuee population than is desirable from a point of view of sound 
medical practice. 

Evacuees are provided medical care, hospitalization, and medica¬ 
tion without charge. Up to the present, health conditions on the 
centers have been remarkably good. But the current shortage of 
doctors and nurses may make the continuance of such a record ex¬ 
ceedingly difficult. 

EMPLOYMENT 

In order to hold down the costs of administration, the War Relo¬ 
cation Authority has filled the great majority of positions needed in 
the operation of the centers with evacuee personnel. Only key 
supervisory positions are filled with appointed civil-service employees. 
In fact, it is the policy of the War Relocation Authority, so far as 
possible, to provide useful, productive work for all employable 
evacuees. Approximately 90 percent of the employable residents of 
the centers are employed at the present time. Work in the adminis¬ 
trative offices, the transport and warehousing systems, and other 
essential administrative operations employs about a third of this 
number. The remainder are used in productive enterprises in the 
fields of agriculture, industry, and public works. 

Evacuees are selected and assigned to their work under a systematic 
program of employment administration; they are paid at the rate of 
$12, $16, or $19 a month, according to the nature of their duties. 
This compensation is not considered a wage commensurate with the 
work being performed but is more in the nature of a cash allowance, 
intended to enable the evacuees who work to purchase such things as 
haircuts, shoe repairs, tobacco, confections, and other goods and 
services that are not provided by the Authority. Evacuees who work 
also receive a cash clothing allowance for themselves and their de- 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 13 

pendents. Clothing allowances, depending upon the age of the 
dependents and the location of the centers, range from $2 to $3.75 
per month per person. 

AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, AND PUBLIC WORKS 

Y\ hen initial plans for relocation centers were being made the 
Authority did not anticipate the great demand which subsequently 
arose for evacuee labor outside the centers. It was expected that 
extensive programs of agricultural and industrial production and 
public works would be needed to provide useful occupations for the 
evacuees. The possibility of establishing industries, not only to 
produce goods needed in the centers but also goods required in the 
w^ar effort, was extensively explored. Similarly, care was taken to 
locate all centers on relatively large areas of potential or developed 
agricultural land. On a number of centers a substantial program of 
land development was planned. On all centers a number of build¬ 
ings, roads, and other community facilities were omitted from the 
basic construction and left to be built by evacuees. 

Outside demands for labor, however, have reduced the labor forces 
on the centers substantially below what was anticipated. It is now 
evident that there will be little opportunity or need for industrial 
development. A few T small industrial projects contributing to the 
subsistence program of the centers are being operated. A few enter¬ 
prises contributing to the war effort were established in some of the 
earlier centers and will be continued. The extensive industrial pro¬ 
gram, involving the establishment on the centers of industrial plants 
under private management paying prevailing wages, which W’as at 
one time contemplated, has been abandoned as unnecessary. 

On centers having developed agricultural land, production is limited 
to crops needed in the subsistence of the centers. It has appeared 
w r iser in every way to release evacuees for work in private agricultural 
enterprises than to attempt to develop agricultural production for the 
market. On centers on which there is no developed agricultural 
land at present, the Authority is developing only sufficient acreage to 
provide subsistence crops and livestock. All evacuees engaged in 
such activities are compensated in accordance with the established 
employment program of the Authority. 

Even this restricted program is contributing substantially to the 
maintenance of the centers. During the calendar year 1942, with 
most of the centers in operation only a portion of the year, approxi¬ 
mately $800,000 worth of vegetables and other crops w r ere produced at 
four relocation centers. It is expected that $2,750,000 worth of 
vegetables will be produced during the calendar year 1943. Live¬ 
stock and poultry produced on the centers will provide an additional 
contribution to the mess operations program. It is estimated that 
during the fiscal year 1944, the value of livestock and poultry products 
produced on the centers will reach $2,000,000. 

In addition to land development on certain centers, the Public 
Works Program is confined largely to the development and construc¬ 
tion of buildings needed in project operations. These include schools, 
community store buildings, agricultural buildings such as swine and 
poultry sheds, maintenance and repair .shops, and additional quarters 
for appointed personnel. 


14 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


COMMUNITY WELFARE 

Since the evacuee population is a complete cross-section of our 
general population, it inevitably includes a proportion of socially 
maladjusted people, the bad along with the good. Moreover, the 
process of evacuation and relocation has introduced various strains 
and dislocations into the population. For example, eating in mess 
halls, bathing in community bathhouses, and utilizing community 
laundries and toilet facilities have already strained the normal ties 
of family life and threaten to weaken if not destroy the authority of 
parents over their children. These problems are intensified by the 
relatively crowded and inadequate living conditions. 

The War Relocation Authority is attempting to counteract the bad 
social effects of relocation by such administrative means as are at its 
disposal. Considerable can be accomplished through the educational 
system, but in addition the Authority has found it necessary to pro¬ 
vide a qualified social welfare staff on each center. This staff is par¬ 
ticularly concerned with the problems of family relationship, and of 
the old, the sick, and with orphans and delinquent children. The 
welfare staff determines family composition for the purposes of grant¬ 
ing clothing allowances and making housing adjustments, and is 
responsible for administering a program of cash grants to persons who. 
because of health or for other reasons, are unemployable. 

COMMUNITY ENTERPRISES 

The evacuees have been encouraged to establish community stores 
at all centers so that residents might buy essential goods and services 
not furnished by the administration. These include such personal 
services as are provided by shoe-repair shops, mending and pressing 
shops, beauty parlors, and barber shops, and such goods as clothing, 
confections, toilet goods, stationery, and books and magazines. 

All community enterprises have been organized and financed by 
evacuees (either through the use of their own funds or through credit 
secured from private sources) and are operated on a cooperative 
basis with profits used for community purposes or distributed to the 
evacuees in the form of dividends. All evacuee personnel employed 
in the community enterprises are paid out of the funds of the enter¬ 
prises at the same rate as if they were employed in operations of the 
Authority. The enterprises pay the Authority a reasonable rental 
for the space they occupy on the center. The Authority provides 
a community enterprise adviser on each center and undertakes to 
audit the books of the enterprises but otherwise is not responsible 
for their operations. 

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT AND INTERNAL SECURITY 

Although final responsibility for management of the relocation 
centers rests with the War Relocation Authority, the Authority is, 
to the fullest feasible extent, giving the evacuees an active voice in 
the management of their own affairs. 

In the first place, the director of each center has selected in each 
block a block manager to represent the administration in the trans¬ 
mission of information and instructions to the residents and to repre¬ 
sent the block in the presentation of requests and proposals to the 


SElGRIEiGiATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 15 

administration. Block managers are also responsible for seeing that 
block buildings are adequately maintained and that block services are 
kept up to standards. 

In the second place, regulations of the War Relocation Authority 
provide procedures under which members of the evacuee community 
may select a community council and other agencies of community 
government to advise and assist the project director in administering 
community aspects of the center’s activity. While all residents of the 
centers 18 years of age and older may vote in community elections, 
only those 21 or over are permitted, by regulation of the Authority, 
to hold elective office. The authority of the community council, and 
such other agencies of local government and administration as may 
be established, is founded entirely upon the legal authority of the 
project director, as administrative head of the relocation center. It 
is the policy of the Authority to delegate to the evacuee representa¬ 
tives as much authority as is consistent with sound administration 
and as the governmental organization of the community appears qual¬ 
ified to assume. The community organizations of the several centers, 
naturally, vary somewhat in the degree of their development and in 
their capacity to assist the project director. Consequently the degree 
of responsibility delegated by the project directors varies from center 
to center and will continue to be modified as the maturity and compe¬ 
tence of the governmental organization increase or are altered by local 
circumstances. 

Evacuees in the relocation centers are governed by three general 
categories of law and regulation: 

1. The general law of the United States and of the State in which 

the center is situated; 

2. Regulations of the War Relocation Authority and the project 

director; 

3. Regulations made by the community council under the 

authority of the project director and with his approval. 

Enforcement of these laws and regulations is the responsibility 
of the project director, who utilizes in the exercise of his responsibility 
both the agencies of community government and the internal-security 
staff of the center. 

The internal security staff on each center is headed by a qualified 
appointed internal-security officer. He is provided with from 2 to 
10 appointed assistants, the exact number depending upon decision 
by the Authority as to requirements in the center. In addition, the 
internal-security officer directs a staff of evacuee internal-security 
assistants. These evacuee officers are selected because of their 
previous police experience or other special qualifications for the work. 
They are trained particularly in the preventive aspects of police 
administration. 

EXTERNAL SECURITY 

Bv agreement between the War Relocation Authority and the 
Army, the exterior boundary of each relocation center is guarded by 
a military police detachment. During the day the military police 
patrol the perimeter of the entire project area; at night they maintain 
a patrol around the immediate boundary of the relocation center 
or barracks area. In addition, they are available to assume responsi¬ 
bility for policing the interior of the center upon request of the project 


16 SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 

director. The Authority has experienced only one case in which 
it was found necessary to ask the military police to assume responsi¬ 
bility for maintaining order within a relocation center. This was in 
the Manzanar Relocation Center in California early in December. 
Experience at that time indicates that the present military policing 
arrangements are entirely adequate to maintain the external security 
for which they are intended and to assume responsibility when 
necessary for maintaining order within the centers. 

ISOLATION CENTER 

Primarily as a result of the disturbance which occurred at the 
Manzanar Relocation Center in December 1942, the War Relocation 
Authority in early 1943 worked out procedures whereby persistent 
and incorrigible troublemakers among the evacuees might be removed 
from relocation centers. Arrangements were completed with the 
Department of Justice empowering the Authority to certify for 
detention in internment camps alien residents of relocation centers, 
who, in the judgment of the project director, constitute a threat to 
the community peace and security. For the handling of trouble¬ 
makers among the American citizens at relocation centers, however, 
a special center had to be established under direction of the War 
Relocation Authority. 

In January of 1943 a temporary center of this kind was established 
on the site of an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp near 
Moab, Utah. The first group to be transferred to this center was a 
contingent of 23 men from .Manzanar who were suspected of being the 
instigators behind the December outbreak. In April the Moab 
Center was closed out and its population transferred to the present 
isolation center which is located on the site of an Indian boarding 
school at Leupp, Ariz. The current population of the Leupp Center is 
70 evacuees. 

FIRE PROTECTION 

Because of the highly inflammable character of the buildings at all 
relocation centers and the comparatively dry climate at most of them, 
the fire hazard is unusually acute. From the beginning, intensive 
efforts have been made to train evacuee fire-fighting crews and to 
make the population of each center fire conscious. Fire protection 
work at the centers is under the direction of a member of the ap¬ 
pointed (nonevacuee) staff and currently involves evacuee crews 
ranging from 34 to 93 members, depending on the size and needs of 
each center. The total fire loss at the 10 centers up to June 15, 1943, 
was $25,894 or 25 cents per capita. 

BASIC POLICIES ON LEAVE AND OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT 

Ever since the evacuation, the military authorities and the War 
Relocation Authority have had arrangements under which evacuees 
might be privately employed in various parts of the country outside 
the evacuated area on the "Pacific coast. The War Relocation Author¬ 
ity first took the position that evacuation should be completed, the 
relocation centers built and staffed, and all evacuees transferred to 
the centers before expending a major effort on private relocation. 
However, the need for labor in agriculture, especially for the produc- 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAIL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


17 


lion of sugar beets, became so great that the 'Western Defense Com¬ 
mand and the W ar Relocation Authority made arrangements for the 
recruitment of farm and other work in May 1942 when the great 
majority of the evacuees were still in the Army assembly centers. 
By July 1, 1942, some 1,700 evacuees were employed under this joint 
procedure in 5 Y\ estern States. During the fall harvest season about 
10,000 were employed on group work leave in 11 States. 

SEASONAL LEAVE 

Recruitment of evacuees under the group-leave policy (also called 
seasonal-work leave) and their release from both assembly centers and 
relocation centers were accomplished under the following terms: 

1. Evacuees proceeded at the expense of the employer to a desig¬ 

nated locality, usually a county. 

2. Evacuees were recruited only for areas in which the United 

States Employment Service certified that labor was needed. 

3. Evacuees were granted group work leave to accept employ- * 

ment under the terms of a written contract. (They were, 
however, permitted to move to other employers in the 
same areas and, with prior approval of field representatives 
of the Authority, were permitted to move from one desig¬ 
nated area to another, as the need for labor shifted. Thus, 
many evacuees who started work in the spring were kept 
in continuous employment throughout the summer. Out 
of the 10,000 on group work leave in 1942, about one-fifth 
are still in outside employment under the group leave 
policy.) 

4. Evacuees were given group work leave to go only to States 

in which the Governor had given written assurance that he 
would maintain law and order and to counties in which 
similar assurances had been provided by local authorities. 

This group-leave procedure has undoubtedly given the evacuees an 
opportunity, which, for the most part, they welcomed, to work as free 
labor, and to assist in the agricultural program of the country. It 
contributed substantially to the production of sugar in the United 
States. There were some minor changes in the group-work-leave 
procedures before the beginning of the 1943 agricultural season, 
and at the same time the type of leave was designated as seasonal 
work leave. On July 1, 1943, there were approximately 5,500 
evacuees on seasonal work leave. 

TEMPORARY AND INDEFINITE LEAVE 

On October 1 , 1942, the War Relocation Authority published in 
the Federal Register leave regulations embodying the present policies 
of the Authority on the granting of leave to evacuees to depart from 
centers. These regulations outline three general types of procedure 
under which leave from relocation centers may be granted: 

1. Group work leave under terms of the procedure outlined 

above; 

2. Short term leave for a period not to exceed 60 days, under 

which evacuees may be permitted to attend funerals, visit 

S. Doc. 96, 78-1-2 



18 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL. AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


sick relatives, attend court, or take care of other important 
business, justifying tlieir temporary release from the centers. 

3. Indefinite leave, under which evacuees subject to the con¬ 
ditions outlined below are permitted to leave the centers 
to take up permanent residence. 

Any resident of the relocation center is eligible to apply for indefinite 
leave, but before leave is granted the following procedure is carried 
through: 

1. The evacuee must show that he has a definite offer of employ¬ 

ment or other evidence that he can take care of himself at 
some point outside the areas from which persons of Japanese 
descent are excluded by military order. 

2. The War Relocation Authority must secure reasonable assur¬ 

ance that the community in which the evacuee proposes to 
relocate will accept him without incident. 

3. The War Relocation Authority has acquired extensive infor¬ 

mation concerning the past history, affiliations, and attitudes 
of evacuees past the age of 17 years. On the basis of these 
records, leave permits are granted as a further precaution, 
names of more than 85 percent of the evacuees have been 
checked against records of the Federal Bureau of Investiga¬ 
tion, and these checks will be continued until the list of 
adult evacuees has been completely covered. If there is evi¬ 
dence from any source that the evacuee might endanger the 
internal security of the Nation or interfere with the war 
effort, permission for leave is denied. 

4. In addition, there has been established a joint board, composed 

of representatives of the War and Navy Departments and 
the War Relocation Authority. This board maintains 
liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Approval 
of the board is required by the War Department for evacuees 
who desire to work in war industries and has been secured 
for those who wish to relocate from relocation centers into 
the Eastern Military Area. Such approval is given only 
after all pertinent information available from the cooperating 
agencies has been examined and evaluated. 

5. The evacuee must agree to keep the War Relocation Authority 

informed of his location at all times. 

At the present time some 10,000 evacuees, approximately 900 of 
them college students, are on indefinite leave. 

No phase of the relocation program has been given more careful 
study and thought than the leave policy of the Authority. On the 
one hand, the problem of national security has been kept constantly 
in mind. On the other hand, the Authority has recognized from the 
outset that a relocation program which stopped with the transfer of 
evacuees to relocation centers would create more national problems 
than it would solve. It has never been the policy of the Federal 
Government to incarcerate aliens, and certainly not citizens, solely 
on the basis of their racial or national origin and regardless of their 
individual merits. 

The leave policy was discussed with both the Attorney General 
and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before it was 
announced. The leave regulations were approved by the Department 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAlL ANlD DISLOYAL JAPANESE. 


19 


of Justice before they were issued. The leave process requires con¬ 
tinuous, close cooperation between the War Relocation Authority 
and the Department of Justice. The leave policy has also been ap¬ 
proved by the War Manpower Commission from the point of view 
of its contribution to the manpower supply of the country. Through 
cooperation with the War Manpower Commission, relocation offices 
established by the Authority at appropriate locations throughout the 
country are endeavoring to place evacuees in occupations which will 
contribute as effectively as possible to the war effort. 

Under the sponsorship of the National Student Relocation Com¬ 
mittee, a nongovernmental organization, several hundred evaucees 
have been granted leave from relocation centers to attend college in 
institutions outside the evacuated areas. For severed months students, 
with the cooperation of the War Department, were granted special 
educational leave from Army assembly centers and later from reloca¬ 
tion centers under temporary procedures of the Authority. Under 
present regulations, attendance at college is one of the purposes for 
which indefinite leave is granted. All students, now on educational 
leave, are subject to the same investigation and restrictions as are ap¬ 
plied to other evacuees granted indefinite leave. 

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE RELOCATION PROGRAM 

The evacuation and relocation program raise important questions 
of constitutionality. This is so because two-thirds of the persons of 
Japanese ancestry evacuated from west coast military areas are citizens 
of the United States. The great majority of the remainder are law- 
abiding aliens. 

It is the position of the War Relocation Authority that its leave 
regulations are essential to the legal validity of the evacuation and 
relocation program. These leave regulations establish a procedure 
under which the loyal citizens and law-abiding aliens may leave a 
relocation center to become reestablished in normal life. 

When the evacuation was originally determined upon, it was con¬ 
templated that the evacuees would be free immediately to go anywhere 
they wanted within the United States so long as they remained outside 
of the evacuated area. Approximately 8,000 evacuees left the 
evacuated area voluntarily at that time and 5,000 of these have never 
lived in relocation centers. The decision to provide relocation centers 
for the evacuees was not made until some 6 weeks after evacuation 
was decided upon, and was made -Largely because of a recognition of 
the danger that the hasty and unplanned resettlement of 112,000 
people might create civil disorder. 

Detention within a relocation center is not, therefore, a permanent 
part of the evacuation process. It is not intended to be more than a 
temporary stage in the process of relocating the evacuees into new 
homes and jobs. 

The detention or internment of citizens of the United States 
against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been 
made, or can be made, for longer than the minimum period necessary 
to screen the loyal from the disloyal, and to provide the necessary 
guidance for relocation, is beyond the power of the War Relocation 
Authority. In the first place, neither the Congress nor the President 
lias directed the War Relocation Authority to carry out such deten¬ 
tion or internment. Secondly, lawyers will readily agree that an 


20 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


attempt to authorize such confinement would be very hard to recon¬ 
cile with the constitutional rights of citizens. 

On June 21, 1943, the Supreme Court of the United States handed 
down its decision in the case of Gordon Hirabayashi v. United States. 
Hirabayaslii had been convicted of violating both the curfew orders 
and the evacuation orders applicable to Japanese-Americans. The 
Court held that the curfew was a valid exercise of the war power. 
Although the question of the validity of the evacuation orders was 
presented to the Court in that case, the Court did not find it necessary 
to divide that question. There is evidence in the majority and 
concurring opinions of the Court in the Hirabayashi case that, although 
it found the curfew to be valid, it believed the evacuation orders 
present difficult questions of constitutional power, and detention 
within a relocation center even more difficult questions. Mr. Justice 
Murphy in his concurring opinion said concerning the curfew orders: 

In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power. 

Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion said: 

Detention for reasonable cause is one thing. Detention on account of ancestry 
is another. Obedience to the military orders is one thing. Whether an individual 
member of a group must be afforded at some stage an opportunity to show that, 
being loyal, he should be reclassified is a wholly different question * * *. 

But if it were plain that no machinery was available whereby the individual 
could demonstrate his loyalty as a citizen in order to be reclassified, questions of 
a more serious character would be presented. The United States, however, takes 
no such position. 

The Chief Justice, in the majority opinion, was careful to point 
out that the Court was limiting its decision to the curfew orders and 
was not considering the evacuation orders or confinement in a reloca¬ 
tion center. 

More than a year has passed since evacuation was begun. During 
this year the War Relocation Authority has had time to make neces¬ 
sary investigations and to begin the process of considering the evacuees 
on an individual basis. The release procedures, including the leave 
regulations, are intended to provide the due process and hearing which 
fair dealing, democratic procedures, and the American Constitution 
all require. 

SEGREGATION OF THE DISLOYAL 

The War Relocation Authority is now undertaking to segregate 
from the total population in relocation centers those individuals who 
have indicated (either by express statement or by action) that their 
loyalties lie with Japan in the current hostilities. These individuals 
will be quartered in a segregation center to be established on the 
grounds of the Tule Lake Relocation Center in Northern California. 

The first group to be segregated will be those individuals—about 
6,300 in number—who have requested repatriation or expatriation 
to Japan and who have not withdrawn their applications prior to 
July 1, 1943. In determining who shall be segregated over and above 
this group, the War Relocation Authority will hold individual hear¬ 
ings and will carefully weigh all available evidence. Aside from the 
repatriates and expatriates, candidates for segregation will be drawn 
from the following groups: 

1. American citizen evacuees who have refused to pledge loyalty 
to the United States and alien evacuees who have refused 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL ANID DISLOYAL JAPANESE 21 

to swear that they would abide by the laws of the United 
States and refrain from interfering with the war effort; 

2. Persons who have been denied leave clearance under the 
procedures of the War Relocation Authority because of an 
adverse report from a Federal intelligence agency, or some 
other information indicating loyalty to Japan. 

Hearings connected with segregation are already under way at the 
relocation centers and are being carried forward as rapidly as possible. 
Present residents of the Tule Lake Center who are eligible for indefi¬ 
nite leave and who are thus not to be segregated will be given a choice 
of relocating immediately or transferring to one of the other centers. 
Residents of the other centers who are designated for segregation will 
be transferred to Tule Lake. Actual movements will begin in Septem¬ 
ber as soon as preliminary arrangements can be completed and 
transportation becomes available. 

Segregation is being carried out primarily to separate the loyal 
evacuees in relocation centers from the influence of those who are 
pro-Japanese and to speed the relocation in normal communities of 
the loyal group. It is not, however, in any sense a punitive program 
and the segregation center is not to be confused with the isolation 
center maintained at Leupp, Ariz. As a group, the segregates will 
be law-abiding persons who have simply given up trying to become 
adjusted in the United States. Any person at the segregation center 
who shows persistent troublemaking tendencies will be transferred to 
the isolation center. 

An appeals board will be established at the Tule Lake Center to 
rectify mistakes that may be made in the segregation process and to 
hear the cases of those who wish to appeal their status. Except for 
those whose appeal is granted, residents of the segregation center 
will not be eligible for seasonal or indefinite leave. 

In most other respects, the residents of the segregation center will 
be accorded the same type of treatment that is now given to residents 
of relocation centers generally. They will be provided by the Govern¬ 
ment with food, shelter, and medical care. Work opportunities will 
be available for those who wish to earn spending money and clothing 
allowances. Education will be furnished to children of school age. 
There will not, however, be opportunity for the establishment of an 
evacuee government at the segregation center. 

EVACUEE PROPERTY 

Determination by the Army that persons of Japanese ancestry 
should be evacuated from certain Pacific coast areas was accompanied 
by a recognition that assistance in the conservation of the property 
and property rights of evacuees should be given by the Federal 
Government. Respect for this principle was dictated not only by 
standards of equity but also by ordinary business sense. 

On March 15, 1942, the Army announced the formation of the 
Wartime Civil Control Administration. The Treasury Department, 
acting through the Federal Reserve Bank, was asked to take over the 
conservation of urban evacuee property, including real and personal, 
both business and residential, and intangible assets. The Farm 
Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture was as¬ 
signed the task of accomplishing continuity in the agricultural opera- 


22 SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 

tions already under way by evacuees and fair and equitable dealings 
in the - 'transfer - of evacuee interests to substitute operators. 

On March 17, 1942, the Farm Security Administration established 
the wartime farm adjustment program to assist in a fair disposition 
of evacuee agricultural holdings and to aid qualified farmers in taking 
over such operations and obtaining credit. Where usual channels of 
commercial and governmental credit were not open to substitute opera¬ 
tors, the Farm Security Administration received from the War Depart¬ 
ment $1,000,000 for a lending program. Subsequently, an additional 
$5,000,000 from the President’s emergency fund was made available to 
them. Some 650 loans, totaling approximately $3,500,000, were 
made from these funds. 

Prior to the departure of evacuees to assembly centers, they were 
passed through one of 64 control stations established in Military 
Zone No. 1 in cooperation with the United States Employment Service. 
In these control centers three-man teams, composed of representatives 
of the Federal Security Agency, Federal Reserve Bank, and the Farm 
Security Administration were available to assist evacuees in settling 
their affairs before the evacuation dead line, and to check to determine 
whether arrangements for handling of their property had been com¬ 
pleted by the evacuees. 

Activities oj the Federal Reserve Bank. 

This agency rendered assistance to evacuees in the leasing or 
otherwise disposing of their urban properties, and on March 29, 1942, 
provisions for the storage of personal property and effects of evacuees 
in warehouses were published, and evacuees were urged to take 
advantage of this service. This activity was administered by the 
Federal Reserve Bank through its set-up designated as the Evacuee 
Property Department. As evacuees were transferred to assembly 
centers, those who availed themselves of the service afforded by the 
Federal Reserve Bank placed their household goods and personal 
belongings in warehouses leased by the bank for this purpose. A 
considerable percentage, however, preferred to place their goods in 
private storage, either in warehouses of their own selection, in churches 
and meeting halls, or with nonevacuee friends. 

Pursuant to an agreement between the War Relocation Authority 
and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the property of 2,867 
evacuees was assigned by the above bank to the War Relocation 
Authority. These goods totaled over 2,000 tons in weight. 

The records of the Federal Reserve Bank indicate that there were 
referred to them some 5,000 properties of either residential or com¬ 
mercial character. The list included all those activities normally 
engaged in by business and professional people with a high percentage 
of the total being in cleaning establishments and laundries, hotels, 
nurseries, and residences. Food markets also held a high place in the 
statistical summary. 

Activities oj the Farm Security Administration. 

The records of the Farm Security Administration indicate that some 
6,664 pieces of agricultural property, totaling 258,000 acres, were 
involved in the evacuation process. Practically all this land was 
intensively cultivated and devoted to the production of the food 
requirements of the area. 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND- DUS LOYAL JAPANESE 


23 


The farm machinery used on these properties was disposed of in 
one of several ways: 

(a) Outright sale; (6) by a leasing arrangement; (c) as a loan to 
the lessee of the evacuee’s farm, the only requirements being mainte- 
nance and upkeep. 

Some was placed in storage. It was usually insisted upon by the 
Farm Security Administration that where the equipment was re¬ 
quired for the operation of the property, equipment as well as land 
should be included in the transfer arrangements. 

Responsibilities of the War Relocation Authority. 

Since completion of the evacuation in the summer of 1942, both 
the Federal Reserve bank and the Farm Security Administration 
have taken the position that responsibility for the future handling 
of evacuee property should rest with the War Relocation Authority. 

Scrutiny of the statistics presented above clearly indicates the im¬ 
portance of maintaining production of farm lands and of maximum 
possible utilization of all other property, both in the national interests 
and to preserve the equities of the owners thereof. Failure so to do 
would have a detrimental effect in several ways. The impact upon 
the tax structure of the communities involved would be serious. The 
food supply of the areas wherein the properties are located would be 
affected. There would be a marked reduction in the housing facilities 
in certain defense areas, notably in Seattle, where 206 out of a total 
of 325 hotels (63 percent) in the city were operated by Japanese. 

Organization. —-It was recognized that the evacuees, having been 
removed from the areas indicated, were no longer in a position to 
personally operate, manage, or otherwise care for their property. The 
War Relocation Authority accordingly established the Division of 
Relocation Assistance. This Division has a Pacific coast evacuee- 
property office at San Francisco. There are field offices in Seattle, 
Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. In addition, provision 
has been made for evacuee-property representatives at each relocation 
proj ect. 

Functions. 

Evacuees are free to choose the manner in which they desire to 
have their properties cared for. They may select a person or concern 
to act as attorney-in-fact, they may choose an agent to act for them, 
or they may deal directly with persons having transactions with them. 
The services of the evacuee-property office are made available to 
evacuees if they prefer to use them. The functions of this office 
include acting upon the request of evacuees to determine if property 
is being properly maintained; securing tenants or operators of both 
agricultural and commercial property; negotiating leases or sales; 
adjusting differences; checking inventories of goods and equipment; 
and similar activities. The policies guiding the activities of the 
evacuee-property office are predicated upon the national interests 
and a recognition of the need for preserving the lawful interests of 
evacuees. 


ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY 

Each of the 11 centers of the War Relocation Authority (including 
the isolation center at Leupp, Ariz.) is administered by a project 
director, who is responsible for supervising all activities within the 


24 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


center and for cooperating with the commander of the military police 
company assigned to exterior patrol. Each director is provided with 
a staff of from 125 to 200 nonevacuee assistants. Top positions in 
all branches of community and project administration are occupied 
by these civil-service employees. At the present time more than a 
third of all project appointed personnel are employed in the education 
program. 

Each project director is immediately responsible administratively 
to the Director of the Authority. He is vested by the Director with 
appropriate authority to expend and account for Government funds 
allotted to the project, to employ appointed personnel under civil- 
service regulations, and to purchase and to utilize necessary supplies 
and equipment. Subject to regulations and policies of the Authority 
and the general laws and regulations of the Government service, he is 
in full charge of the relocation center. 

The Office of the Director of the War Relocation Authority is main¬ 
tained in Washington, D. C. The Director is appointed by the 
President, and, within the framework of the Office for Emergency 
Management, of the Executive Office of the President, is administra¬ 
tively responsible to him. The Director is assisted by a Deputy Direc¬ 
tor and a staff in Washington, organized into the following divisions: 

1. Reports; 

2. Administrative Management; 

3. Office of the Solicitor; 

4. Relocation Planning; 

5. Relocation Assistance; 

6. Community Services; 

7. Employment; 

8. Agriculture and Engineering. 

Three Assistant Directors of the Authority are maintained in field 
offices; one in Little Rock, Ark.; a second in Denver, Colo.; and the 
third in San Francisco, Calif. Each field Assistant Director has from 
one to three principal assistants and a small clerical staff. The field 
Assistant Directors are responsible for assisting the Director in in¬ 
spection and supervision of relocation centers and other field activities 
of the Authority and for representing the Director in contacts with 
other governmental agencies and with the public. 

To perform the functions of the War Relocation Authority in the 
field of evacuee property management, a property office under the 
direction of the Relocation Assistance Division in Washington is 
maintained in San Francisco. Branches of this office have been lo¬ 
cated in Seattle and Los Angeles. To assist in the relocation of 
evacuees outside centers, and to maintain contact with those who 
have been granted leave, a series of field offices has been established 
under the direction of the Employment Division of the Washington 
staff. At the present time key relocation offices have been established 
in Salt Lake City, Denver, Kansas City, Chicago, Cleveland, New 
York City, and Boston. Nearly 40 branch offices have been set up 
at other cities located mainly throughout the interior sections of the 
country. 


SEGREGATION OF LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE 


25 


INDIVIDUAL EXCLUSION 

In addition to work connected with the relocation of the Japanese- 
American population, with which the War Relocation Authority is pri¬ 
marily concerned, the Authority is also responsible lor providing 
assistance to individuals excluded from military areas. Removal of 
the Japanese-American population from the Pacific coast is the only 
wholesale evacuation which the Army lias ordered under Executive 
Order 9066. It has for some months, however, been engaged in the 
removal of designated individuals, both aliens and citizens, from 
restricted areas along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. Under 
the present procedure, individuals, after appropriate investigations 
and hearings, are ordered by the military authorities to leave the 
restricted areas. Pursuant to Executive Order 9102, the War Reloca¬ 
tion Authority has developed procedures under which it interviews 
individual excludees, and undertakes to provide them with such 
financial and other assistance as they may require to comply with the 
military orders. It is not expected, however, that the individual ex¬ 
clusion program will ever approach in scope or complexity the work of 
the Authority arising from the evacuation of the Japanese population 
from the west coast. 


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